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INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES,
edited by Nicholas Tsagourias1
AMAYA ALVEZ 2
THE STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM presupposes a conceptual
and theoretical shift of perspectives. This shift is related to the development of
analytical tools that capture the tension between legality and legitimacy outside
of state boundaries, which have constituted the traditional boundaries of legal
discourse. The numerous processes of transnational constitutionalization
present a particular challenge for those theories that too easily project learned,
domestic notions of political power, law, and legitimacy onto conflict situations
in the transnational arena.
3
Nicholas Tsagourias's collection of essays, Transnational Constitutionalism:
International and European Perspectives, offers numerous perspectives on the
myriad normative underpinnings, practical examples, and political contexts of
transnational constitutionalism in Europe and abroad. The reader is left with the
impressiori that the project of transnational constitutionalism is an aspirational,
rather than descriptive, endeavour. As such, it aims to limit political power
through law and create a global legal community. Tsagourias's theoretical
roadmap underlines the constraints of this project, including the lack of
1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 377 pages [Tsagourias, Transnational
Constitutionalism].
2. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Concepci6n, Chile. Ph.D. Candidate,
Osgoode Hall Law School.
3. Peer Zumbansen, "Transnational Law" in Jan M. Smits, ed., Elgar Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006) 738 at 740; Gunther Teubner, "The
King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy" (1997) 31 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 763.
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legislative or governmental power at the international level and the absence of a
body politic that can bind its members. European constitutionalism, therefore,
represents a unique process, which seeks to contain the negative impulses of
nation-states and promote peace through human rights and the rule of law.'
This book provides a timely reminder that the achievement of this global
political community is currently endangered due to the weak legal procedures
of the world organization. As Jiirgen Habermas recently observed, such
procedures are selective in nature and are sometimes compromised by the
unilaterally imposed decisions of a superpower acting with hegemonic
interests.6 These dynamics present a particularly challenging context for
transnational law, and Tsagourias's collection is an illustrative reminder of the
importance of such projects.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I examines the role of states,
courts, and constitutional principles through four chapters, which offer
intriguing views on traditional rule-of-law institutions and how they deal with
the evolving constitutional order. The authors explore the transformation of
governments and courts in the context of transnational polities, focusing both
on the European Union (EU)7 and the transnational.8 Part II fruitfully
continues this exploration through a discussion of the various forms of
governance that emerge in the grey space between domestic and international
legal orders. Together, the four chapters present a formidable perspective on the
challenges facing the institutional order of nation-states and new international
treaties by regulatory regimes. The first two chapters make a compelling
argument for the reassessment of the assumed hierarchy of norms and
4. Nicholas Tsagourias, "Introduction-Constitutionalism: A Theoretical Roadmap" in
Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 1.
5.. J.H.H. Weiler, "Fin-de-siicle Europe: Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?" in J.H.H.
Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: "Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?"and Other Essays
on European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 238.
6. Jiirgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) at 116.
7. Pavlos Eleftheriadis, "The Standing of States in the European Union" in Tsagourias,
Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 44.
8. Nicholas Tsagourias, "The Constitutional Role of General Principles of Law in International
and European Jurisprudence" in Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 71
[Tsagourias, "Constitutional Role"]; Julian Rivers, "Proportionality and Discretion in .
International and European Law" in Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note
1, 107.
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institutions in international law by exploring the relationship between regions
and state-centred international organizations, such as the United Nations
(UN),9 and the multi-level character of the EU's foreign relations." The last
two chapters in this part use the concepts of self-determination" and
deliberative democracy12 to argue for a better understanding of emerging
governing regimes. Finally, Part III concludes with two perceptive treatments of
the conceptual and doctrinal nature of the emerging transnational constitutional
order. Building on important developments in the work on comparative
constitutional law, chapters by Bardo Fassbender13 and Wouter Werner" discuss
the place of transnational constitutional law between comparative and international
law. The following gives a more detailed treatment of the book's three parts and
its individual chapters.
I. THE HARD AND THE SOFT: THE MILANGE OF STATES, COURTS,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
In the first chapter of the book, Patrick Capps questions the productive use of
social contract theory in capturing the dynamics of the emerging transnational
legal order.1" In his view, the attempt by states in the international arena to
"subject themselves to an institutional mechanism designed to authentically
express the general will of the world community, embodied in the idea of the
9. Nigel D. White, "Hierarchy in Organizations: Regional Bodies and the United Nations" in
Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 135.
10. Ramses A. Wessel, "The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign Relations" in
Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 160.
11. Achilles Skordas, "Self-determination of Peoples and Transnational Regimes: A
Foundational Principle of Global Governance" in Tsagourias, Transnational
Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 207.
12. Tonia Novitz, "Challenges to International and European Corporatism presented by
Deliberative Trends in Governance" in Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism, supra
note 1, 269.
13. Bardo Fassbender, "The Meaning of International Constitutional Law" in Tsagourias,
Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 307.
14. Wouter Werner, "The Never-ending Closure: Constitutionalism and International Law" in
Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 329.
15. Patrick Capps, "The Rejection of the Universal State" in Tsagourias, Transnational
Constitutionalism, supra note 1, 17.
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universal state," is not explained through basic concepts in contractualism, such
as consent, obligation, and institutional forms. 6 Capps perceptively claims that
the deficit in this approach is a result of the limitations in our practical ability
to imagine an order, aim, and legal structure of the international beyond that of
the sovereign state. Alternatively, he proposes a system of governance that calls
for a revolutionary approach to international law.
Pavlos Eleftheriadis then provides an insightful perspective on the challenges
facing the EU from a burgeoning body of transnational constitutional law.'7 He
argues that the appropriate starting point for a political and constitutional
theory is a new and unique cosmopolitan framework for states, beyond that
of conventional constitutional structures. 8 Eleftheriadis's argument focuses
on the judicial architecture of the EU, especially the constitutional principles
of subsidiarity and proportionality enshrined in Article 5 of the European
Community Treaty (EC Treaty).
In chapter three, Tsagourias compares the role played by the European
Court of Justice (EC), from a transnational perspective, with that of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), from an international perspective. 9 In his
opinion, the ECJ performs the role of a constitutional court: it is endorsed by
the EU's political institutions and, having been described as the driver of
European integration, identifies itself with the EU's political and legal culture.
In contrast, the ICJ cannot possess a constitutional role because the international
sphere is a compendium of parallel orders-an "acentric system" with no legal
place for an authoritative adjudication body.2" A decisive aspect of Tsagourias's
argument is the way in which principles are invoked in the absence of legal
rules. The ICJ has limited itself for fear of overstepping its jurisdictional limits,
while the ECJ has assumed the role of a surrogate legislature based on its
legitimate participation in the constitutional dialogue within the EU political
order. The chapter convincingly extrapolates the inevitable part the courts must
play in initiating political debates in an evolving polity defined by hybrid
governance structures.
16. Ibid. at 18.
17. Eleftheriadis, supra note 7.
18. Ibid. at 46.
19. Tsagourias, "Constitutional Role," supra note 8.
20. Ibid. at 88.
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Julian Rivers concludes this part of the book by suggesting factors that may
give rise to judicial discretion in the context of proportionality review.21 These
include necessary and balanced policy options, the uncertainty of state goals,
and cultural arguments based on an abstract set of values. Rivers approaches
proportionality through the lens of Robert Alexy's "theory of constitutional
rights."22 Through the consideration of principles as "optimization requirements"
and the necessary balancing of conflicting principles, Alexy's ideas have led
authors, like Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, to claim that these principles
"constitute the basic conceptual foundations" of proportionality as a defining
feature of global constitutionalism.23 Rivers proposes an analysis of the
approaches of the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights, and the UN
Human Rights Committee in order to distinguish between the different types
of judicial discretion and to examine the challenges that this poses to the
proportionality analysis.
II. SHIPS PASSING IN THE NIGHT? THE INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
CHALLENGE IN TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
The second part of the book consists of four chapters devoted to the study of
different aspects of the transnational constitutional interface. First, Nigel White's
chapter addresses the tension between universalism and regionalism since the
inception of the UJN.2" He accepts a presumption in favour of regional organizations
that possess the power to impose economic sanctions against members and, in
certain circumstances, third states. In doing so, he fails to appreciate the dangers
in not indicating who will guard the rational use of that discretion, and the
consequences of its inappropriate use by regional entities. White acknowledges
the lack of representation that undermines the legitimacy of decisions made by the
UN Security Council and promotes the 2004 High Level Panel Recommendation25
21. Rivers, supra note 8.
22. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, trans. by Julian Rivers (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
23. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, "Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism" (2008) Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 14 at 14,
online: <http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/fss/papers/14/>.
24. White, supra note 9.
25. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN GOAR, 59th Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 55, UN Doc. A/591565 (2004).
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as a solution. Recent events, particularly the attacks against Yugoslavia and Iraq
without prior UN Security Council authorization, challenge White's argument.
Focusing on the intricate regulatory nature of the EU, which is marked by
semi-federalism and multi-level governance, Ramses Wessel explores the nature
of EU governance as an example of an international constitution.26 Consequently,
the European foreign affairs constitution is seen as a structured system of
retained acts of will and is described in Philip Allot's words as a "legal
constitution."2 Wessel's aim is to shift the internal horizontal delimitation
between the fields of EU activity to a vertical understanding focused on the
relationship between the EU and its members. Through this, he endeavours to
recognize.the interplay between the global, European, and domestic legal orders.
28
In chapter seven, Achiles Skordas argues that "self-determination ... should
be perceived as a structural principle introducing a worldwide process of
communication on the terms of the establishment of authority over a territory."29
More specifically, he explores the relationship between the principle of uti
possidetis-which claims that boundaries are not changed in the case of secession-
and the ideas of pouvoir constituent and "the people." Similar to Thomas Franck,
he claims that uti possidetis "relies on its capacity to reduce complexity [and]
concentrates upon the ... proceduralisation of territorial autonomy."3" Skordas
reassesses self-determination in transnational regimes, with special reference to the
EU. He examines this as a hybrid example characterized by the self-determination
of states as a supra-legal organization, and by the self-determination of regimes
as an aspiring political-territorial entity.31 Skordas's underlying argument, which
claims that self-determination is a principle of global governance whose purpose
is to safeguard stability and peace, is attractive. However, the foundational
premise of his "system theoretical" perspective-namely that the so-called
international community is a "system" to begin with-is questioned by recent
developments like the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo.
26. Wessel, supra note 10.
27. Ibid. at 204; Philip Allot, Eunomia: New Orderfor a New World Order (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
28. Wessel, ibid. at 206.
29. Skordas, supra note 11 at 210.
30. Ibid. at 218-19.
31. Ibid. at 245.
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Tania Novitz compares international and European corporatism." She
suggests that the International Labour Organization has a greater ability to
accommodate corporate practices within a deliberative framework of
governance than under the social dialogue provisions of the EC Treaty.33 Her
contribution makes this volume more insightful on the development of
transnational constitutionalism as a new subject of law. The conclusions,
however, contradict the overarching tenor of the book, which claims that the EU
and its institutions are the best accomplishment of transnational constitutionalism
to date.
III. LEARNING FROM DIFFERENCE: THE COMPARATIVE, THE
INTERNATIONAL, AND THE TRANSNATIONAL
The third part of this book focuses on visions of international constitutionalism
in chapters by Bardo Fassbender, who concentrates on the meaning of
"international constitutional law," and by Wouter Werner, who describes the
challenges that international constitutionalism faces in becoming the dominant
paradigm in international law. The starting point for Fassbender is that the
fundamental legal order of any autonomous community or body politic can be
addressed as a constitution. 3 He claims that the Charter of the United Nations
(UN Charter) can be'considered the constitution of the international community,
even though it was formally created as a treaty. He argues that the document
has been "confirmed and strengthened" in the last fifty years and, therefore, can
be referred to as the substantive and formal constitution of the international
community.35  Appropriately, Fassbender acknowledges some of the
shortcomings in the adoption of the UN Charter as a constitution. These
include a very restricted ambit of definition, protection, and guarantee of basic
rights; the necessity to accommodate states' congtitutions; and the noticeable
gap between constitutional rules and reality.36
Werner then argues that the ideas of jus cogens and world order treaties
have compelled international law to start using a constitutionalist currency
32. Novitz, supra note 12.
33. Ibid. at 301.
34. Fassbender, supra note 13 at 308.
35. Ibid. at 322.
36. Ibid. at 325-26.
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when describing public international law.37 However, violations of fundamental
norms by powerful countries-most notably the United States-strain the global
constitutionalist project. Werner concludes that "[i]nternational constitutionalism
has not been able to shake off the tensions, paradoxes and limitations of domestic
constitutionalism." These problems, which include the tension between
politics and society, testify that the overall normative ambition of international
constitutionalists ought to be kept in check.
Transnational Constitutionalism engages the reader in relevant and
meaningful ways with the challenges that this new legal discipline faces.
Situated uncomfortably between international human rights law, comparative
constitutional law, and emerging proposals of international constitutional law,
transnational constitutionalism is, in a sense, international constitutionalism
(beyond the state) with a twist. As these authors show, transnationalism is more
than internationalism and, indeed, something radically different from it.
37. Werner, supra note 14.
38. Ibid. at 366.
